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Professor Mofsky's thesis is that state securities laws, popularly
called "blue sky laws," raise substantial entry barriers to new busi-
nesses. His book is short, with barely 61 pages of text. His style is
argumentative, for he is interested in showing that the anti-
competitive effects exist, not in measuring them. But this is a book
every securities lawyer should read to appreciate that there is a serious
question as to the social value of the law he practices.
Professor Mofsky begins by outlining the history of "merit regu-
lation" in state securities laws beginning with the Kansas statute of
1911.1 The concept of merit regulation is that the state should make
an official judgment as to the risks involved in the securities offering
proposed, and prevent the securities from being offered if the dangers
to the investor are too great. The weakness of this concept, when
tested against the capitalistic system, is that it analytically divorces
the risk of loss from the chances for gain. To an investor, risk is not
a dirty word. The essence of his investment decision is a weighing of
the risks of loss against the chances for gain. The outcome of this
weighing is, in effect, his judgment as to the value of the investment.
There are circumstances where even the wisest poker player will draw
to an inside straight. 2 Insofar as state securities laws ignore this
decision-making process, they interfere with the optimal allocation of
resources under conventional theories of capitalism-that is, that cap-
ital should be allocated through an aggregation of individual judg-
ments in the institution of the free market place.
The lopsidedness of merit regulation on the theoretical level has
led on the practical level to making merit judgments by rules of
thumb, rules that finesse the ultimate question of value by identifying
particular characteristics of the issuer and the securities in question.
These rules, by and large, indicate that a security is worth what it is
I. Act of March 10, 1911,ch. 133, §§ 1-17, [1911] Kan. Laws 210-16.
2. In draw poker with nothing wild, the odds indicate the player should draw when the ratio
of the amount already in the pot to the amount of the bet necessary to draw is more than 43 to
4.
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being offered for: for example. the universal exemption for securities
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. and the frequent regulations
limiting the amount and price of cheap stock sold to the promoters
before stock is offered to the public. The general problem with this
type of rule of thumb is simply that it is not designed with new
business promotions in mind -that is. securities of an issuer not yet
publicly held cannot be'listed. or approved for listing on notice of
issuance, on the New York Stock Exchange.3 A new business is invar-
iably formed around a "thing" of debatable value-a possible min-
eral deposit, or a new service, product or idea. The capitalistic system
is based on the notion that the power of that "thing" to attract capital
in the free market is the best test of its value; yet. the new business
promotion falls into the dilemma that only the market can establish
its value, but until its value is established it cannot have access to'the
market.
Professor Mofsky works out his idea in terms of the application
of the restrictive rules in Florida to a hypothetical new business pro-
motion. A man with limited capital wishes to start his own business
producing promotional items to be included in the containers of
household products. Unable to raise capital from banks, the Small
Business Administration or other institutional sources, he turns to the
idea of a stock of'1ring. He soon finds that if the offering is to be
exempt from registration in Florida. he is limited to twenty-five sub-
scribers and cannot avail himself of the help of an investment banker
or other intermediary, unless the intermediary is willing to work for
nothing. He must also preserve his exemption from the registration
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 by restricting the number and
type of offerees to ensure the availability of the "private" or "intras-
tate" offering exemptions. On the other hand, if he is willing to
undergo the expenses of state and federal registration. the percentage
share of the stock he can obtain for his intangible contributions is
limited by the Florida rule providing that securities of a promotional
company will not be permitted to be registered for public sale unless
3. The New York Stock Exchange generally will not list a stock unless there are at least
2.000 stockholders with 1,800 holders of 100 shares or more. 1.000.000 outstanding shares with
800,000 shares publicly-held, with the market value of the publicly-held shares at least
$14,000,000. earnings before federal income taxes in the last fiscal year of S2.500.000. and
$2.000,000 in each of the two preceding years. NEw YORK STOCK ExCfIANGI:. LISTING PROCL.-
DURE AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF APPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINAL LISTING I
(1969).
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the equity investment of the promoters or insiders in tangible assets
amounts to at least fifteen percent of the total equity investment in
the corporation resulting from the sale of the entire offering, regard-
less of the value the market place might put on the contribution of
intangible property. This rule. like others discussed by Professor Mof-
sky. does not require an effort to evaluate the intangible property, but
fixes an arbitrary limit to what the promoter can obtain from a
market that presumably may be willing to pay more.
Professor Mofsky's conclusion is that this form of regulation
produces substantial anticompetitive effects for the promoter who
wishes to maximize his participation in control of the new enterprise
because he is blocked from access to capital markets and is compelled
to sell in a limited market-for example, institutional investors. It
also has anti-competitive effects for the promoter who wishes to act
as an intermediary between the new enterprise and sources of capital
because he is barred not only from many markets but is also arbitrar-
ily limited as to the compensation he may receive. The chances for
reform in this area of the law are, moreover, described as poor. The
organized power blocs-the stock exchanges, the major underwrit-
ing firms and established businesses in general-have no desire to
reduce entry barriers. The state securities commissioners and the
S.E.C. are responsive to those power blocs alone, and, in any event,
take pleasure in their positions of power. Although Professor Mofsky
observes that securities lawyers do not oppose the entry barriers of
the present law. he does not suggest that they would oppose a re-
formed law without such entry barriers, but which yet included a
sufficient degree of complexity to protect their jobs.
It would be a mistake to read this book as more than a statement
of the single hypothesis "that for all the good that administrative
regulation ought to do. there are inevitable effects of such regulation
which were originally unintended and which may be costly to the
public."' It is no more than a statement because it makes no attempt
to measure or weigh the economic effect of "merit regulation" either
in dollars or against countervailing benefits. For example, Professor
Mofsky argues that some inventors are deterred from putting their
inventions into production by the costs of surmounting the regulatory
scheme. This may be true. but need not represent social cost if the
4. J. MOFSKY. BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEw BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 1 (1971).
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invention will come into production for less than what the investor
would have been able to obtain. In other cases, if the effect of the entry
barriers is only to make the entrepreneur sell cheap to richer men, but
the product is offered to the public at the same price, the social cost
may be insignificant-merely a matter of how the spoils are divided.
The absence of a broad objective evaluation cannot be blamed on
Professor Mofsky. To come up with a dollar evaluation of the eco-
nomic loss or gain of "merit regulation" requires an accurate ap-
praisal of the value of the enterprises thwarted by the pattern of
regulation, and it is the very impossibility of making such a determi-
nation, except through the mechanism of the free market, that is a
postulate of his book. But while a general evaluation is impossible,
some comparison of the relative economic costs of certain techniques
of securities regulation may be possible. In the familiar shibboleth of
the plaintiffs antitrust bar, there may be "less restrictive alterna-
tives" that would achieve nearly the same social benefit without as
much economic cost; for example, a statute restricting the individual
investor in the percentage of his capital which he may place in highly
speculative securities.
Another place where a relative judgment as to the amount of
economic cost involved could be formed is in the distinction between
the promoter who seeks to manage the new business and is willing to
share its fortunes and the promoter who merely seeks to act as an
intermediary between the business and capital markets-that is, the
underwriter. Restrictions that prevent the manager from competing
on an equal basis for capital in the public market seem more harmful
than restrictions on underwriters' compensation. If the limit of under-
writers' compensation is safely above the price of finding informed
investors, this limit may keep the underwriter from having an incen-
tive to seek another market more difficult to penetrate: uninformed
investors.
The book may also be. criticized for limiting its analysis to merit
regulation without any comparison to regulation by disclosure, the
other popular theory. Regulation on a pure disclosure theory may
have similar anticompetitive effects. Professor Henry Manne has, for
example, argued emphatically that information is not a costless good'
and Professor Mofsky supports this by pointing out that the cost of
5. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 47-57 (1966).
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a full-fledged registration under the Securities Act of 1933 generally
ranges between S17.000 and $35,000 in attorneys' fees and approxi-
mately $12,500 in printing costs.
The approach of the book can be criticized on yet another level.
The idea that there are substantial economic costs in merit regulation
rests on the notion that our capital markets do improve the allocation
of capital. This may be demonstrated in terms of particular economic
models, but it is not the notion behind such direct and indirect govern-
mental subsidies as the oil depletion allowance, special depreciation
for low-income housing and pollution control facilities, or the ship
building subsidies.
But the point of the book is a good one. The social costs of merit
regulation are largely ignored, and this is well illustrated by the recent
revisions of the Wisconsin and California blue sky laws discussed by
Professor Mofsky. Perhaps arbitrary laws are the hardest to change
because, lacking a reasonable premise, there is no basis for modifica-
tion; the choice appears to be all or nothing, and the idea of the state
securities commissioner as a public watchdog fending off the ruthless
confidence men has popular appeal. So while one wishes that each
state securities commissioner would spend the hour necessary to read
this short book, one is forced to recognize that it probably would not
change anything.
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